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In this paper, we analyse the provision of enhanced communications between vehicles. It is expected that vehicles will have several
communication devices, and that a specialised node will provide external connectivity to these devices, i.e., the devices in the vehicle form
a Mobile Network. We propose the use of Network Mobility communication solutions for providing access from the vehicles to an infra-
structured network (e.g., the Internet) or for communication with other vehicles. The main contribution of this paper consists in a route
optimisation solution for mobile networks – based on the use of mixed ad hoc and infrastructure communications – that enables inter-
vehicle communications to be improved in terms of bandwidth and delay. The mechanism provides the same level of security than
today’s IPv4 Internet, by means of reusing Mobile IPv6 security concepts, and the use of public key cryptography and Cryptographically
Generated Addresses. The proposed solution is characterised and evaluated through extensive simulation, showing that it provides an
efficient optimisation in vehicular communications.
 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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Many people in modern societies spend a considerable
amount of time in cars. Up to now, vehicular communica-
tions have been mainly restricted to cellular communica-
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towards ubiquitous communications [1]. Vehicles should
provide access to the Internet and also communication
among themselves, supporting new services and
applications.
Examples of services and applications (see Fig. 1) that
are of interest for automobile users are personal communi-
cation services, Internet access services, vehicular specific
services such as traffic information or car diagnosis activi-
ties, entertainment services, and broadcast/multicast ser-
vices. The provision of these services and applications in
a vehicular scenario poses some challenges that require to
be solved, mainly related to mobility management and
security.
It is expected that several devices within a vehicle will
likely benefit from having Internet connectivity (the so-
called car-to-Internet scenario): internal sensors, on-board
computers, infotainment back-seat boards, etc.; but also
external devices, such as laptops or PDAs, carried by pas-
sengers. Therefore, our architectural assumption is that
Fig. 1. Some examples of applications and services in a vehicular scenario.
1 http://www.drive-thru-internet.org/.
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(Mobile Routers) providing nodes of these networks with
the external communication access. A Mobile Router, as
it will be described later, not only provides connectivity
to the network deployed in the car, but also manages trans-
parently the mobility of the whole network, without putt-
ing any additional requirements on the devices attached
to the mobile network. Since it is expected that in forth-
coming 4G networks multiple access technologies will be
available, Mobile Routers will benefit from this heteroge-
neity by having more than one network interface (e.g.,
GPRS/UMTS, WLAN and Bluetooth, among others),
allowing the Mobile Router to forward the traffic through
the most appropriate interface. As an example, in vehicular
environments, the use of additional WLAN interfaces may
allow the creation of multi-hop ad hoc networks by several
vehicles, to optimise local (car-to-car) communications.
Besides the Internet access, there are several applications
which involve a vehicle-to-vehicle communication. This
kind of scenario may be supported by using Network
Mobility solutions, so cars can communicate through the
fixed infrastructure but, in this case, when the cars are close
enough, a further optimisation is possible, namely to com-
municate directly using an ad hoc network. In this way,
better bandwidth than the one in the communication
through the infrastructure can be achieved. Typically, this
will be true even if we use a NEMO Route Optimisation
solution for the communication through the fixed Internet.
The reason is that, although the number of hops can be
similar, the communication with the infrastructure will typ-
ically use a technology with lower bandwidth (for example,
UMTS) than the ad hoc network (for example, WLAN).
Also, the ad hoc route will probably result in lower costs.
This paper presents a Route Optimisation solution
called Vehicular Ad hoc Route Optimisation for NEMO(VARON). VARON allows local car-to-car communica-
tions to be optimised, by enabling – in a secure way – the
use of a Vehicular Ad hoc Network (VANET) for local
communications among cars (instead of using the infra-
structure). In VARON, communications security in the
ad hoc network is provided through use of the infrastruc-
ture, guarantying that the peer available through the ad
hoc network is the same that the one through the infra-
structure. Besides, the robustness of VARON against ad
hoc routing attacks is build on the hop-by-hop authentica-
tion and message integrity of routing messages, and the use
of Cryptographically Generated Addresses. However, this
involves a performance cost, since cryptographic opera-
tions, such as signature generation/verification, consume
time and energy. This cost could be of some concern, spe-
cially in energy and resource constrained devices. However,
in the case of Mobile Routers deployed in cars, this is not a
big issue, since vehicles have a powerful and rechargeable
source of energy.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. A
brief summary of the background and related work is pro-
vided in Section 2. Section 3 describes the security exploits
that may appear in vehicular ad hoc car-to-car optimisa-
tions. Our route optimisation mechanism for vehicular
environments, VARON, is described in detail in Section
4. Section 5 evaluates VARON through simulations.
Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper.2. Background and related work
This section summarises some of the concepts, terminol-
ogy and related protocols that are used through the paper,
and the related work and motivation for optimisation
mechanisms in inter-vehicle communication scenarios.2.1. Enabling internet connectivity in automobiles: Network
mobility
Fig. 2 shows an example of a vehicular scenario, that
involves both communications between nodes inside a vehi-
cle and the Internet, also called car-to-Internet communica-
tions (addressed in this section), and communications
among vehicles, called car-to-car communications
(addressed in Section 2.2).
There are several approaches that may be used to enable
Internet access from automobiles. Initially, only cellular
radio technologies were taken into account [2]. More
recently, with the success of the IEEE 802.11 WLAN tech-
nology, it is being investigated how to overcome the limita-
tions of existing cellular radio networks (e.g., cost, low
bandwidth, high delay, etc.), by making use of this technol-
ogy and multi-hop ad hoc protocols. As an example, the
Drive-thru Internet project1 proposed an architecture based
on the deployment of several roadside IEEE 802.11 Access
Fig. 2. Vehicular communications scenario.
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cles. One of the challenges posed by this architecture is that
there could exist ‘‘holes’’ in the connectivity, that would pre-
vent vehicles from communicating. In [3], a solution to mit-
igate this problem of intermittent connectivity is proposed,
by means of a mechanism based on application gateways
and proxies. Another drawback of this kind of solution is
that it does not support transparentmobility amongdifferent
technologies (e.g., a handover fromWLAN to UMTS when
no WLAN APs are available). The ability to switch among
different access networks is critical for future 4G
deployments.
Vehicular communication scenarios involve groups of
devices moving together, so it seems more appropriate to
use a network mobility approach [4], instead of host centric
solutions, that would force each device within a car to man-
age its own connectivity to the Internet (including all the
issues related to mobility).
The Network Mobility (NEMO) Basic Support protocol
[5], proposed by the IETF,2 extends the basic end-host
mobility solution, Mobile IPv6 [6], to provide network
mobility support. In this solution, a mobile network
(known also as Network that Moves – NEMO3) is defined
as a network whose attachment point to the Internet varies
with time. The router within the NEMO that connects to
the Internet is called the Mobile Router (MR). It is
assumed that the NEMO has a Home Network, connected
to the Internet, where it resides when it is not moving. Since2 http://www.ietf.org/.
3 NEMO can mean NEtwork MObility or NEtwork that MOves
according to the context.the NEMO is part of the Home Network, the Mobile Net-
work Nodes (MNNs) have configured addresses belonging
to one or more address blocks assigned to the Home Net-
work: the Mobile Network Prefixes (MNPs). These
addresses remain assigned to the NEMO even when it is
away from home. Of course, these addresses only have
topological meaning when the NEMO is at home. Thus,
when the NEMO is away from home, packets addressed
to the Mobile Network Nodes will still be routed to the
Home Network. Additionally, when the NEMO is con-
nected to a visited network, the MR acquires an address
from the visited network, called the Care-of Address
(CoA), where the routing architecture can deliver packets
without any additional mechanism.
The goal of the network mobility support mechanisms
[7] is to preserve established communications between the
MNNs and their external Correspondent Nodes (CNs)
despite movement. Packets of such communications will
be addressed to the MNNs’ addresses, which belong to
the MNP, so an additional mechanism to forward packets
between the Home Network and the NEMO is defined.
The basic solution for network mobility support [5] essen-
tially creates a bidirectional tunnel between a special node
located in the Home Network of the NEMO, called the
Home Agent (HA), and the Care-of Address of the MR
(see Fig. 3).
The NEMO Basic Support protocol [5] has the follow-
ing limitations:
• It forces suboptimal routing, i.e., packets are always for-
warded through the HA, following a suboptimal path
and therefore adding a delay in the packet delivery.
Fig. 3. NEMO Basic Support protocol operation overview.
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the Path MTU (PMTU). Specifically, an additional
IPv6 header (40 bytes) is added to every packet because
of the MR–HA bidirectional tunnel.
• The HA becomes a bottleneck for the communication as
well as a potential single point of failure. Even with a
direct path available between an MNN and a CN, if
the HA (or the path between the CN and the HA or
between the HA and the MR) is not available, the com-
munication is disrupted.
These problems are exacerbated when considering
nested mobility (i.e., a mobile network gains connectivity
through other mobile networks), since in this case the pack-
ets are forwarded through all the HAs of the upper level
mobile networks involved.
Because of these limitations, it is highly desirable to
provide what has been called Route Optimisation (RO)
support for NEMO [8], to enable direct packet exchange
between a CN (that is, any communication peer on the
Internet) and a Mobile Network Node (MNN), avoiding
traversing the Home Network. There exist several
NEMO RO proposals [9,10] that eliminate or mitigate
the aforementioned problems, although many of them
require changes in the operation (i.e., upgrading the soft-
ware) of CNs and/or MNNs and/or HAs. Furthermore,
the additional load that may be required to perform new
mobility functionalities to support a NEMO Route Opti-
misation mechanism, may be too high for certain devices
within a car (e.g., sensors), because of their limited
capabilities.MIRON [11] is a proposal of a solution for Route
Optimisation that does not require upgrades in CNs,
MNNs, or HAs. MIRON has two modes of operation:
• The MR performs all the Route Optimisation tasks on
behalf of those nodes that are not mobility capable –
thus working as a Proxy MR [9].
• An additional mechanism, based on PANA [12] and
DHCP [13], to support mobility-capable hosts (i.e.,
Mobile Nodes attached to a NEMO) and routers (i.e.,
nested Mobile Routers) that actually have mobility
and Route Optimisation capabilities to manage their
own Route Optimisation.2.2. Optimising car-to-car communications
There exist several vehicular applications, such as
multi-player gaming, instant messaging, traffic informa-
tion or emergency services, that might involve communi-
cations among vehicles that are relatively close each
other (i.e., car-to-car communications) and may even
move together (e.g., military convoys). These applica-
tions are currently not well supported in vehicular
scenarios.
Although automobiles can communicate with other
vehicles through the infrastructure (the Internet) by means
of the NEMO Basic Support protocol, they could benefit
from better bandwidth, delay and, most probably, cheaper
communication, by forming vehicular ad hoc networks
(VANETs) and making use of the resulting multi-hop
network to directly communicate with each other. The
C.J. Bernardos et al. / Computer Communications 30 (2007) 1765–1784 1769challenge is to achieve this direct communication through
the VANET with a security level equivalent to the one pro-
vided by today’s IPv4 fixed Internet.
VARON enables to optimise car-to-car communica-
tions in a secure way by combining a Network Mobility
approach – used to support car-to-Internet communica-
tions – with a vehicular ad hoc approach – used when
communication occurs between vehicles that are close
enough to communicate through an ad hoc network
formed by the Mobile Routers deployed within those
vehicles, and perhaps within other vehicles in their
surroundings.
To the best of our knowledge, there is only one pro-
posal, described in [14], that also proposes the combina-
tion of NEMO and ad hoc approaches. The proposed
mechanism in [14] assumes that each vehicle is a moving
network and the performance of inter-vehicular communi-
cations is improved by creating and using a VANET. The
NEMO Basic Support protocol [5] is responsible for the
provision of global Internet connectivity to the moving
network, whereas an ad hoc routing protocol is run
among the Mobile Routers, creating an overlay VANET
for inter mobile networks connectivity. This scheme
enables direct communication between cars’ devices that
belong to the same overlay VANET (direct route),
whereas the NEMO Basic Support protocol is used other-
wise (nemo route). The problem with [14] is that it does
not deal with the security aspects of the solution, and
security is a critical issue for the feasibility of these kind
of solutions.
Security is one of the main issues of this kind of
solution in car-to-car environments, since the use of
ad hoc communications could enable malicious nodes
to perform several types of attacks [15], such as stealing
traffic or flooding a particular node. Next section
describes the security challenges posed by the use of
an ad hoc solution for direct car-to-car communications,
summarising and classifying the attacks that VARON
aims at avoiding. As it will be explained in more detail
in Section 4, VARON benefits from the simultaneous
reachability of vehicles through the infrastructure and
the ad hoc network to secure the communications in
the ad hoc part.3. Exploits against vehicular ad hoc car-to-car optimisations
By using a Vehicular Ad hoc Network to route packets
of a local car-to-car communication, the performance of
the communications in such a kind of scenario may be
greatly improved – in terms of bandwidth and delay –
when compared to data traversing an infrastructured net-
work through a cellular radio network (e.g., UMTS).
However, this kind of optimisation enables many different
types of attacks. In this section, we briefly describe some
relevant examples of attacks that would be possible if no
additional mechanisms were used to secure this optimisa-tion. This would help us introducing all the security prob-
lems that our proposal – VARON (described in Section 4)
– avoids.
There are several types of attacks that may be performed
against a vehicular ad hoc car-to-car optimisation. Next,
we describe the most relevant ones:
• Prefix ownership attacks.Devices within a vehicle form a
mobile network, sharing a prefix (the Mobile Network
Prefix), which is managed by the Mobile Router of the
vehicle. It is necessary to provide Mobile Routers with
a mechanism that enables them to mutually verify that
a Mobile Router actually manages the Mobile Network
Prefix it claims to (i.e., it is authorised to forward/
receive packets addressed from/to that MNP). Other-
wise, a malicious node would be allowed to spoof
(‘‘steal’’) a certain prefix and get all the traffic addressed
to this prefix from other MRs connected to the ad hoc
network.
• Ad hoc routing attacks. The creation and maintenance of
the ad hoc routes to locally exchange traffic between
MRs connected to the VANET, is a critical issue from
the security point of view. This task is performed by
ad hoc routing protocols, which still suffer from a lot
of vulnerabilities, mainly due to the unmanaged and
non-centralised nature of ad hoc networks. Typical
exploits against existing ad hoc routing protocols may
be classified into the following categories [16]:
Æ Modification attacks. A malicious node can cause redi-
rection of data traffic or Denial-of-Service (DoS) atta-
cks by introducing changes in routing control packets
or by forwarding routing messages with falsified values.
As an example of this attack, a malicious node M could
prevent a legitimate node A from receiving traffic from
a node B by advertising a shorter route to B than the
one that the true next hop towards A advertises.
Æ Impersonation attacks. A malicious node can spoof the
IP address of a legitimate node, and therefore steal its
identity, and then perform this attack combined with a
modification attack. The main problem of these attacks
is that it is difficult to trace them back to the malicious
node.
Æ Fabrication attacks. A malicious node can create and
send false routing messages. This kind of attack can
be difficult to detect, since is not easy to verify that a
particular routing message is invalid, specially when it
claims that a neighbour cannot be reached.
Some ad hoc secure protocols make impossible to per-
form some of these exploits (such as ARAN [16]). How-
ever, there is no mechanism that combines in a secure
way a Network Mobility approach, to deal with the issue
of vehicular global connectivity, and a Vehicular Ad hoc
Network, to optimise local car-to-car communications.
By security, we mean a mechanism that is not vulnerable
in the previously described ways.
4 Another example could be a car A from an emergency service convoy
communicating with another emergency car B.
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(VARON)
In this section, we present a novel solution that provides
Route Optimisation for NEMO in vehicular environments,
where a Vehicular Ad hoc Network (VANET) may be
securely created and used to optimise local communica-
tions among vehicles.
It is assumed that the Mobile Router (MR) deployed in
each vehicle will have at least three network interfaces: one
or more ingress interfaces to communicate with the nodes
inside the vehicle that belong to the NEMO (e.g., WLAN,
Bluetooth), one or more egress interfaces to connect to the
Internet (e.g., UMTS, WiMAX, even WLAN in some
cases), and an additional ad hoc interface (e.g., WLAN)
to communicate with neighbouring cars and set-up multi-
hop networks (see Fig. 2). Compared with a normal Mobile
Router (without any ad hoc optimisation), only one (ad
hoc) additional interface is required. It is important to
notice that Mobile Routers deployed in vehicles will not
be much concerned about energy or processing constraints,
as opposed to personal mobile devices or other ad hoc sce-
narios (such as sensor networks).
It is also assumed that vehicle’s devices will be always able
to communicate with other vehicle’s devices through the
Internet, by using the NEMO Basic Support protocol. On
the other hand, there may exist the possibility of enabling
thesedevices todirectly communicate if amulti-hopvehicular
ad hoc network could be set-up by the involved vehicles and
other neighbouring cars. VARONaims atmaking possible to
benefit from this optimisation opportunity in a secure way.
In our proposal, VARON, the MR is the node in charge
of performing the optimisation of the communications.
The steps for carrying out this procedure are the following:
(1) Discovery of reachable MNPs. The MR needs to find
out which other MRs are available within the
VANET, that is, which Mobile Network Prefixes
are reachable through its ad hoc interface.
(2) Creation of a secure ad hoc route between the MRs of
the mobile networks that want to optimise the route
they are using to exchange traffic. The ad hoc routing
protocol used to create this route should provide cer-
tain security guarantees making impossible to per-
form any of the exploits described in Section 3. The
mechanism used by VARON to set-up and maintain
a secure ad hoc route is based on ARAN (Authenti-
cated Routing for Ad hoc Networks) [16], modified
and extended to fulfil the requirements of our Net-
work Mobility based vehicular scenario.
Next, we describe in detail these two steps.
4.1. Discovery of reachable MNPs
Every MR announces its Mobile Network Prefix
(MNP) by periodically broadcasting – through the ad hocinterface – a message, called Home Address Advertisement
(HoAA), that contains its Home Address and an associated
lifetime, to allow this information to expire. These mes-
sages are announced through the ad hoc interface, by using
a hop-limited flooding, so every MR becomes aware of the
MNPs that can be reached through the VANET.
The MR’s HoA is chosen to belong to the NEMO’s
Mobile Network Prefix. The length of the MNP is fixed
to 64 bits (/64) due to security reasons that will be
explained later. Hence, the MNP can be inferred directly
from the HoA (it is the network part of it). With the
MRs’ announcements, every MR is aware of all the
MR’s HoAs (and associated Mobile Network Prefixes) that
are available within the ad hoc network.4.2. Creation of a secure ad hoc route
4.2.1. Building the ad hoc route
In case a Mobile Router detects that there is an ongoing
communication between a node attached to it and a node
attached to another MR that is available through the
VANET and this communication is decided to be opti-
mised (how this decision is taken is out of the scope of this
paper), the MR needs to build a multi-hop route to send
packets directly through the ad hoc network.
An example (Fig. 4) is used to illustrate in more detail
the proposed mechanism. A device (e.g., a back-seat
embedded video game system) in car A is communicating
with another device in car B.4 This communication is ini-
tially being forwarded through the Internet, following the
suboptimal path determined by the NEMO Basic Support
protocol, thus traversing Home Networks A and B before
being delivered to the destination. We call this route Home
Route. By listening to the announcements received in the ad
hoc interface, MR A becomes aware that the destination of
such communication may be also reachable through a
VANET formed by neighbouring VARON enabled vehi-
cles. Then, MR A may decide to start using the vehicular
ad hoc network to route this traffic, instead of sending it
through the Internet.
The first step in this optimisation process is that MR A
must learn and set-up a bidirectional route through the
vehicular ad hoc network to MR B (the MR claiming to
manage MNP B). We call this route Care-of Route. For
doing this, MR A (the originator MR) sends – through
its ad hoc interface – a Care-of Route Test Init (CoRTI)
message (Table 1 summarises our notation) to its one-
hop neighbours:
A! one-hop neighbours :
½CoRTI;HoAB;NA;HoAA;KAþKA
This message includes, besides the identifier of the message
(CoRTI), the final destination MR’s HoA (HoAB), a nonce
Fig. 4. Care-of Route discovery and validation.
Table 1
Table of variables and notation
KA+ Public Key (and CGA related information) of MR A
KA Private Key of MR A
½dKA Data d digitally signed by MR A
NA Nonce issued by MR A
HoAA Home Address of MR A
CoRTI Care-of Route Test Init message type
CoRT Care-of Route Test message type
CoRE Care-of Route Error message type
C.J. Bernardos et al. / Computer Communications 30 (2007) 1765–1784 1771NA (to uniquely identify a CoRTI message coming from a
source; every time an MR initiates a route discovery, it in-
creases the nonce), the IP address of MR A (HoAA) and its
public key (KA+), all signed with the MR A’s private key
(KA). When an MR receives through its ad hoc interface
a CoRTI message, it sets up a reverse route back to HoAA
(MR A’s HoA), by recording the MR from which it re-
ceived the message (so it knows how to send a reply in case
it receives a message that has to be sent back to HoAA). In
order to authenticate the message, a mechanism that se-
curely binds the IP address of MR A (HoAA) with KA+ is
needed. One possibility is to use certificates issued by a
third trusted party, as proposed in ARAN [16], but this
solution seems unfeasible for vehicular environments. In-
stead, this secure binding is obtained by using a special type
of addresses: Cryptographically Generated Addresses
(CGAs) [17].
Cryptographically Generated Addresses (CGAs) are
basically IPv6 addresses for which the interface identifier
is generated by computing a cryptographic one-way hash
function from a public key and the IPv6 prefix.5 The bind-
ing between the public key and the address can be verified
by re-computing the hash function and comparing the
result with the interface identifier (see Fig. 5). In this
way, if the HoA used by MRs is a CGA, a secure binding
between the MR’s HoA and the MR’s public key is pro-
vided, without requiring any Public Key Infrastructure
(PKI) to be available. Notice that by itself, CGAs do not5 There are additional parameters that are also used to build a CGA, in
order to enhance privacy, recover from address collision and make brute-
force attacks unfeasible. We intentionally skip these details. The interested
reader may refer to [17] for the complete procedure of CGA generation.provide any guarantee of prefix ownership, since any node
can create a CGA from any particular Mobile Network
Prefix by using its own public-private key pair. But a node
cannot spoof the CGA that another node is legitimately
using, because it does not have the private key associated
with the public key of that IP address.
A receiving MR (e.g., MR X in Fig. 4) uses MR A’s
public key (included in the message) to validate the signa-
ture, then appends its own public key (KX+) to the message,
and signs it using its private key (KX). The signature pre-
vents spoofing or message modification attacks, that may
alter the route or form loops. Then, it forwards the CoRTI
message:
X ! one-hop neighbours :
½½CoRTI;HoAB;NA;HoAA;KAþKA ;KXþKXUpon receiving this CoRTI message from neighbour MR
X, MR Y verifies the signatures from the originator MR
A and the neighbour MR X, stores the received nonce to
avoid reply attacks and adds a route to HoAA through
HoAX (MR X). Then, the signature and public key of the
MOBILE NETWORK PREFIX (64 bits) CGA INTERFACE IDENTIFIER (64 bits)
NETWORK
PREFIX
MOBILE
PUBLIC KEY
Hash function
Fig. 5. Simplified overview of CGA creation and structure.
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public key, signs the message, and forwards it:
Y ! one-hop neighbours :
½½CoRTI;HoAB;NA;HoAA;KAþKA ;KYþKY
This last step is repeated by any intermediate node along
the path until the CoRTI message reaches the destination
(the target MR, MR B) or the allowed hop limit expires.
Notice that MR B, after receiving the CoRTI message,
has the guarantee that only the node that has the private
key associated with HoAA (KA) could have sent the CoR-
TI message.
Once MR B receives the CoRTI message, it generates a
reply message (including the received nonce NA), called
Care-of Route Test (CoRT), and unicasts it back following
the previously learnt reverse path to the originator
(MR A):
B! Y :
½CoRT;HoAA;NA;HoAB;KBþKB
Each node in the reverse path performs a procedure similar
to the one performed forwarding the CoRTI: the first MR
in the reverse path that forwards the message (i.e., MR Y)
verifies the signature and, if correct, adds its public key
KY+, signs the message and sends it to the next MR in
the path:
Y ! X :
½½CoRT;HoAA;NA;HoAB;KBþKB ;KYþKY
MR X also sets up a reverse route back to MR B’s HoA by
recording the MR from which it received the message.
The remaining MRs in the reverse multi-hop route,
when receiving the CoRT message, verify the signature of
the previous MR, remove it and the associated public
key, add their public key, sign the message, forward it to
the next MR, and set-up the reverse route. In the example,
when MR X receives the message from MR Y, it sends the
following to MR A:
X ! A :
½½CoRT;HoAA;NA;HoAB;KBþKB ;KXþKXWhen the originatorMR (MRA in the example) receives the
CoRT message, it verifies the signature and nonce returned
by the destinationMR (MRB). Once this procedure is com-
pleted,MRBhas successfully established a routewithMRA
within the multi-hop vehicular ad hoc network. This route is
basically a temporal path (Care-of Route) to reach MR B’s
HoA, additional to the default route thatMRAmay always
use to send packets towards MR B (through the Internet,
using the Home Route), and vice-versa.4.2.2. Authenticating the Care-of Route
The Care-of Route cannot be used to forward packets
between NEMO A and NEMO B yet, since it has not been
proved either that MR A manages MNP A, or that MR B
manages MNP B. Only the validity of a route to a node (B
and A) with an address (HoAB and HoAA) for which the
node has the respective private key has been proved to
MR A and MR B. It has not been verified that MR A
and MR B are actually the routers authorised to manage
MNP A and MNP B, respectively. Without further verifi-
cation, nothing could prevent an MR from stealing a
mobile network’s traffic. For example, a malicious node
could be able to claim the ownership of a given IP address
(an address belonging to MNP A) and steal packets
addressed to that prefix (MNP A). This issue is similar to
that of Route Optimisation in Mobile IPv6, where a mech-
anism is required to enable the Mobile Node to prove that
it owns both the Care-of Address and the Home Address.
The Return Routability procedure defined for Mobile
IPv6 is based on two messages sent by the CN, one sent
to the Mobile Node’s Home Address and the other to
Mobile Node’s Care-of Address. Based on the content of
the received messages, the Mobile Node sends a message
to the Correspondent Node [6,15]. By properly authenticat-
ing the message, this procedure is enough to prove that the
Mobile Node has received both messages and therefore it
has been assigned (that is, owns) both the Home Address
and the Care-of Address at that time.
In VARON, we borrow from the Return Routability
(RR) procedure some of the underlying security concepts.
With the RR, the Correspondent Node is provided with
a mechanism to verify that a Mobile Node is able to send
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VARON, what is needed is to provide a pair of end-point
MRs (which are communicating with each other through
the Home Route) with a mechanism to verify that the
multi-hop route within the VANET connects each of them
with the same network (the respective MNP) that each MR
can reach through the infrastructure when communicating
with any address within the MNP of the other MR. In this
way, the two end-point MRs may choose to use that Care-
of Route instead of the Home Route.
The essence of the Care-of Route authentication proce-
dure in VARON is that the two end-point MRs involved in
a particular Route Optimisation procedure request each
other to verify that the VANET Care-of Route may be
used to send traffic between the two NEMOs. This is done
(see Fig. 6) as follows:
• Each Mobile Router generates a key, Kmr, which can be
used with any other MR. In addition, the MR generates
nonces at regular intervals. These nonces6 and Kmr will
be used to generate a security association between the
two end-points MRs.
• Each MR creates two tokens and sends each of them
through one of the possible routes (Care-of and Home
routes). Tokens are generated from Kmr and a particular
nonce.
• The first part of the Care-of Route authentication proce-
dure is done at the same time – and using the same mes-
sages – as the Care-of Route setup (described in Section
4.2.1). The first token, called Care-of keygen token, is
sent piggybacked in the CoRTI message, plus a Care-
of cookie, and the index of the nonce used to generate
the token. The correspondent MR replies in the CoRT
message, including its own Care-of keygen token, its
nonce index and copying the cookie received in the
CoRTI message.
• The second token, called Home keygen token, is sent,
plus a Home cookie and a nonce index, in a separate
message, called Home Route Test (HoRT), through the
MR–HA tunnel (protected by IPsec ESP in tunnel
mode) configured by the NEMO Basic Support proto-
col, using the routing infrastructure. In order to verify
that the correspondent MR is actually managing the
IPv6 network prefix it claims to, that is, the Mobile Net-
work Prefix assigned to the NEMO, the HoRT message
is sent to a random address within the MNP. The MR
that manages the prefix has to intercept7 that message
therefore showing that it actually manages the MNP.86 Note that these nonces are different from the ones used during the ad
hoc route discovery and setup procedure.
7 It is not required the MR to continuously examine every received
packet in order to intercept HoRT messages. The MRmay start inspecting
packets after sending (or receiving) a CoRT message.
8 This test does not guarantee that a node manages a certain prefix, but
that this node is at least in the path toward that prefix. This provides the
solution with a similar security level that today’s IPv4 Internet has.The Mobile Network Prefix length used by VARON
MRs is fixed to 64 bits (/64), in order to avoid a mali-
cious node to ‘‘steal’’ a prefix. Otherwise, for instance,
if an MR was assigned a /64 prefix, then with probabil-
ity 1/2 it could try to spoof a /63 prefix (and steal its
‘‘neighbours’’ packets). By fixing the MNP length, this
attack is no longer feasible.
As in the case of the Care-of Route test, the correspon-
dent MR replies this message with another HoRT mes-
sage, including its own Home keygen token and nonce
index, and copying the received cookie.
• Each MR uses the received Home and Care-of keygen
tokens to create a key, Kbm, that can be used to authen-
ticate a Mobile Network Prefix Binding Update
(MNPBU) message9 – sent along the Care-of Route –,
that enables the other MR to check that the Mobile Net-
work (MNP) reachable through the VANET (Care-of
Route) is the one reachable through the infrastructure.
This verification can be done because each MR has
the information required to produce the key when the
MNPBU is received, and therefore authenticate the
message.
At this point VARON signalling has finished. MR A has
found out that MR B – which owns HoAB and its associ-
ated private key and that is reachable through the VANET
– is also capable of receiving and sending packets sent to
any address from the Mobile Network Prefix (MNP) B
through the infrastructure. This only happens if the HA
responsible of routing packets addressed to this MNP (that
is, HA B) is forwarding to MR B those packets addressed
to MNP B. HA B only would be doing that if proper
authentication has taken place and MR B is authorised
to manage MNP B. The same guarantee also holds for
MR B regarding MNP A and MR A.
The Care-of Route authentication mechanism per-
formed in VARON, as the Return Routability procedure
defined in Mobile IPv6, implicitly assumes that the fixed
routing infrastructure is secure and trusted. As long as this
is true, the mechanism defined is appropriate to secure the
Mobile Network Prefix Binding Update, since it does not
introduce any new vulnerabilities that were not possible
in today’s IPv4 Internet.
Once the process has been completed, the end-point
MRs (MR A and MR B) may exchange traffic using the
set-up Care-of Route within the VANET.9 The generation of this key (Kbm) and the keygen tokens, and the
authentication of the message follow the same mechanisms that the
Return Routability procedure [6,15] and the proposal to extend it to
support network prefixes [18]. We explicitly avoid these details to make the
paper more readable (the interested reader may refer to [6,15] for
additional information).
MR A MR B
CoRTI
CoRT
HoRT
HoRT
MNPBU
through Infrastructure
 (Home Route)
through VANET
 (Care–of Route)
HA A HA B
HoRT
HoRTHoRT
HoRT
MNPBU
Fig. 6. Care-of Route authentication signalling.
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Once the Care-of Route authentication procedure has
finished, all MRs involved in the creation of the ad hoc
route can forward packets to the HoAs of the end-point
MRs (see an example in Fig. 7). However, only the end-
point MRs have verified the association of the correspond-
ing MR’ HoA and the respective MNP. Intermediate MRs
(i.e., MR X and MR Y in the example) have only learnt
host routes towards the Home Addresses of the two end-
point MRs (i.e., HoAA and HoAB). In order to route data
traffic between cars’ nodes with addresses belonging to
MNP A and MNP B, each end-point has to tunnel the
packets towards the other MR’s HoA, through the
VANET route. In this way, intermediate MRs in the ad
hoc route just forward the packets based on the host routes
(with the end-point MRs’ HoAs as destination) added to
their routing tables during the ad hoc Care-of Route crea-
tion process (see Fig. 7).
The Care-of Route discovery and validation signalling is
repeated periodically, both to refresh the ad hoc routes and
to avoid time-shifting attacks. If an ad hoc route becomes
invalid (for example, because it expires) or it is broken, and
traffic is received through this route, a Care-of Route Error
(CoRE) message is sent (and forwarded) by each MR in theFig. 7. Overview of packet ropath to the source MR. For example, if intermediate MR Y
in Fig. 7 receives data traffic from MR A addressed to MR
B and the link between MR Y and the next hop towards
MR B (in this case, MR B itself) is broken, then MR Y
sends a CoRE message to the next MR along the path
towards the source MR (MR A), which is MR X, indicat-
ing that there is a problem with this Care-of Route:
Y ! X :
½CoRE;HoAA;HoAB;NY ;KYþKY
This message is received by MR X, which after verifying
the authenticity of the received CoRE, signs the message,
adds its public key KX+ and the signature to the message
(as performed by intermediate MRs when processing and
forwarding CoRTI and CoRT messages) and sends it to
the next hop towards MR A.
Y ! X :
½½CoRE;HoAA;HoAB;NY ;KYþKY ;KXþKX
Upon reception of this error message, the source MR (MR
A in the example) switches to use the Home Route for
sending packets and it may start a new route discovery pro-
cedure to set-up a new optimised Care-of Route within theuting within the VANET.
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ing that a route has become invalid is only processed by an
MR if the neighbour that is forwarding the message is the
next hop of this route. Otherwise, malicious nodes would
be able to set as invalid any Care-of Route.
There exist several possible mechanisms that can be used
to detect that a Care-of Route is no longer working. As an
example, Mobile Routers may check if the data packets
forwarded within the VANET have been correctly received
by the next hop making use of link layer acknowledgement
frames (if the MAC layer supports that). If several data
frames have not been acknowledged, this may be used as
an indication that the next hop is no longer reachable
and therefore the Care-of Route is broken.
4.3. Security analysis
A malicious node M could attempt several attacks to
this scheme. Basically, there are two main types of attacks:
those that try to modify the routing in the VANET, and
those that try to steal a prefix. In order to modify the ad
hoc routing, an attacker out of the routing path could try
to alter or fabricate routing messages. Such kind of attack
is not feasible because all routing messages are crypto-
graphically signed. An additional attack could be to try
to impersonate a legitimate node (spoofing its IP address),
but this is not possible either, since the authenticity of a
message is guaranteed by the use of CGAs and public
key cryptography. Two possible examples of these attacks
are described next.
A malicious node M can try to change an already
established ad hoc route by sending a CoRTI message
to an MR X that belongs to this multi-hop route, claim-
ing that M can reach a certain MR A. But X will not
accept the message if it cannot validate it with the public
key corresponding to the HoA of MR A associated with
the route. Because M cannot create that part of the
CoRTI message, it can try to copy it from a real CoRTI
message previously sent by MR A, but the nonce included
will not be greater than the one stored in MR X that is
associated with the route. Notice that a legitimate update
of the route by MR A is allowed because it knows its own
private key and the nonce that must be included in the
CoRTI message.
A malicious node M that receives a CoRTI message
from an MR A could try to claim to a neighbour MR X
that it is MR Z and not M (when sending the CoRTI mes-
sage towards MR B). If MR Z is a legitimate network
node, this could mean that afterwards all the traffic will
be sent to it (DoS attack). But M will not be able to do that
because it does not have the private key associated with the
HoA that MR Z is using.
One example of an attack based on spoofing a prefix will
be as follows. A malicious node M could create a HoA
belonging to the MNP managed by a legitimate MR A.
The node M can create the HoA belonging to the MNP
of MR A using its own public key so it can prove to othernodes that it has the private key corresponding to that
address. However, the Home Route Test will fail, so it can-
not make another MR send to it the traffic addressed to the
MNP of MR A. In this situation, the node M can set-up an
ad hoc route for its HoA (using its own private key), since
the routes created in the VANET only define the forward-
ing of packets addressed to MRs’ HoAs (see Fig. 7). There-
fore, different routes for HoAs belonging to the same prefix
could coexist (although only one at most will belong to
non-malicious nodes). However, only legitimate end-point
MRs will success in performing the Home Route Test
and, therefore, will be able to generate and send a valid
MNPBU (enabling the use of the Care-of Route). Notice
that packets sent to a legitimate IP address equal to a
HoA used by a malicious node to create an ad hoc route,
will reach the intended destination because they will tra-
verse the ad hoc network encapsulated inside a tunnel with
the legitimate HoA.
There are some vulnerabilities and attacks that are still
possible, resulting from the inherent nature of ad hoc net-
works, such as certain Denial-of Service (DoS) – e.g., based
on non-collaborating nodes – or route discovery flooding
attacks. But, notice that VARON nodes can always revert
communications to the Home Route in case of the Care-of
Route is not working.
5. Performance of VARON
In order to complete our discussion about the proposed
solution, an extensive simulation study was performed.
Besides analysing the performance and costs of VARON,
the value of some metrics using VARON are compared
to the ones obtained when plain NEMO Basic Support
protocol [5] or MIRON [11] (as an example of a non ad
hoc Route Optimisation for NEMO) were used.
5.1. Computational cost
Each VARON Mobile Router must perform several
cryptographic operations (such as signing and verifying sig-
natures) on each signalling message along a Care-of Route.
These cryptographic operations are relatively expensive,
especially when compared to the operation of the NEMO
Basic Support protocol and other (insecure) ad hoc routing
protocols, that do very little (almost negligible) computa-
tion per signalling message. However, it is important to
note that only the routing control messages that make
the state of the MR change or the MR perform an action
(e.g., modifying the routing table, forwarding a message,
etc.) are subject to signing/verifying. The signature of those
routing messages that are discarded (e.g., because they
have been already processed and are received again for-
warded by a different MR) is not verified. Data packets
exchanged between nodes after a route has been set up
are not processed by VARON either.
In order to evaluate the computational cost of VARON,
several tests were conducted, measuring the raw processing
11 OPNET University Program, http://www.opnet.com/services/univer-
sity/.
12 VARON model has approximately 10000 lines of code.
13 In the simulations, Care-of routes were marked as expired after 20 s.
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processing VARON routing packets for different key sizes.
The cryptographic functions were implemented making use
of the OpenSSL Library,10 which provides functions for
general purpose cryptographic tasks such as public and pri-
vate key encryption/decryption and signature creation/ver-
ification. The measurements were conducted in two
different types of devices that are likely to play the role
of a vehicular Mobile Router: a Linksys WRT54GS router
(which is a small home and office broadband router,
equipped with a 200 MHz processor, an IEEE 802.11g
WLAN interface and an IEEE 802.3 Ethernet interface
connected to a VLAN capable 5-port switch) and a laptop
(Intel Core-duo 2.0 GHz with 2 GB RAM).
The processing performed by an MR on VARON con-
trol packets is composed of some of the following opera-
tions (depending on the VARON message, not all of
them are performed on each packet):
• CGA verif.: Verification of the CGA. If the message has
been forwarded by an intermediate MR, the CGAs of
both the original sender and the forwarder have to be
checked.
• Sign. verif. 1: Verification of the signature of the sender
MR.
• Sign. verif. 2: Verification of the signature of the for-
warder MR (in case of the message has been forwarded
by an intermediate MR).
• Sign. comp. 1: Computation of the signature by the sen-
der MR when a new message is generated (e.g., a
CoRTI/CoRT message).
• Sign. comp. 2: Computation of the signature by an inter-
mediate MR when a message has to be forwarded (e.g.,
a CoRTI/CoRT message).
Table 2 shows the results for each of the cryptographic
operations that are involved in the processing of VARON
routing messages. The processing time for the laptop and
the Linksys router were measured over three different
RSA key sizes: 512, 768, and 1024 bits. For both devices,
an increase in the key size of 256 bits results in approxi-
mately doubling the signature computation processing.
The time required to verify a signature or a CGA is almost
negligible compared to the time required to compute signa-
tures, as expected, because of the nature of public key cryp-
tography. It is also interesting, although not very
surprising, the difference in processing times between the
laptop and the Linksys router. For each key size, the pro-
cessing time is between 10 and 20 times slower on the rou-
ter than on the laptop. The results obtained for the Linksys
router for the 1024-bit RSA key have been used as input to
the simulations described in the next section. This will pro-
vide us with more realistic results (that can be considered as10 http://www.openssl.org/.a lower bound on the performance if more powerful
devices were used instead).
5.2. Simulation of VARON
We performed our simulations using OPNET.11 We sim-
ulated 50 vehicles within a road. Each vehicular MR is
equipped, in addition to the ingress interface (to provide
connectivity to the vehicular devices), with an emulated
UMTS egress interface (1 Mbit/s, 150 ms of average one-
way delay) and an IEEE 802.11 (WLAN) interface (2
Mbit/s, transmission power of 1 mW, receiver sensitivity
of -95 dBm) in ad hoc mode. The UMTS interface has been
emulated because OPNET UMTS models did not properly
support IPv6 at the time of performing the simulations.
The UMTS channel has been modelled using a 1 Mbit/s
WLAN 802.11b network, with an additional delay of
150 ms per way. The link delay has been chosen based on
previous practical measurements [19–21]. In order to
achieve global coverage, the transmission power of the
WLAN nodes (MRs and the Access Point) that emulates
the UMTS was set to 1 W. Considering the kind of analysis
that we were interested in performing, this set-up provided
us with a reasonable model of a UMTS network.
The UMTS interface provides continuous Internet con-
nectivity, whereas the WLAN interface enables forming
multi-hop vehicular ad hoc networks. UMTS and WLAN
were chosen for the simulations because they are probably
the most realistic candidate access technologies for a vehic-
ular communication scenario nowadays. However, differ-
ent technologies may also be used by VARON (e.g.,
IEEE 802.16e WiMAX for the MR’s egress interface),
since the protocol is independent of the access technology
used by the Mobile Router.
In order to evaluate the worst case scenario, VARON
was simulated using 1024 bit RSA keys and the processing
time results shown in Table 2 for the Linksys router as
input for the simulations. All the VARON protocol, but
the detection of broken links and the generation of CoRE
messages, was implemented using the OPNET simulator.12
By not implementing the detection of broken routes, a
Care-of Route entry can only be removed from the IP rout-
ing table of an MR when it expires.13 Hence, it may happen
that an MR tries to use a broken Care-of Route for some
time (until it expires), since MRs along the path are not
able to detect a broken route and therefore they do not
send any CoRE message to the source MR – that would
make it stop sending the traffic through the VANET andExpired Care-of routes are not kept in the IP routing table for 10
additional seconds, so there is enough time for the Mobile Router to
refresh the Care-of Route (in case there is data traffic being delivered using
this route). These values were chosen after performing several sets of
simulations aimed at finding good values for these parameters.
Table 2
Raw time required to perform the cryptographic operations required when processing VARON signalling packets
RSA key size (bits) Average ± Std. Dev. (ms)
CGA verif. Sign. verif. 1 Sign. verif. 2 Sign. comp. 1 Sign. comp. 2
Laptop
512 0.47 ± 0.05 0.42 ± 0.05 0.40 ± 0.02 2.36 ± 0.09 2.46 ± 0.20
768 0.47 ± 0.02 0.52 ± 0.04 0.52 ± 0.01 5.09 ± 0.16 5.13 ± 0.43
1024 0.59 ± 0.16 0.87 ± 0.05 0.89 ± 0.09 12.03 ± 0.27 11.94 ± 0.36
Linksys
512 13.58 ± 0.07 11.06 ± 0.06 11.08 ± 0.07 45.90 ± 0.37 45.86 ± 0.28
768 14.08 ± 0.93 12.72 ± 0.71 12.57 ± 0.43 79.86 ± 0.78 80.64 ± 1.31
1024 13.73 ± 0.38 14.47 ± 0.06 14.52 ± 0.08 136.61 ± 0.41 136.66 ± 0.44
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mance obtained from the simulation results is worse than
the one that would be obtained if the protocol were com-
pletely implemented.
A random delay uniformly distributed between 0 and 1
second was added before forwarding a HoAA message in
order to minimise collisions. This random delay was intro-
duced because it was observed that the performance when
HoAA messages were forwarded immediately after their
reception was quite poor. This is related to the 802.11
MAC protocol, which does not perform a ready-to-send/
clear-to-send (RTS/CTS) exchange for broadcast packets,
and therefore does not prevent high probabilities of colli-
sion of broadcast packets from appearing in relatively
dense networks such as the simulated one (50 nodes).
In order to evaluate the performance of VARON under
different real-case scenarios, VARON experiments were
performed varying the following two parameters:
(a) Vehicle speed. Different simulations were run for
average vehicle speeds of 1, 5, 10, 20, 40, 50, 70, 90,
100 and 120 km/h.14 The speed of a node is a random
variable, uniformly distributed between 0.9v and 1.1v,
where v is one of the previous mean speed values.
Therefore, in each simulation, nodes have different
speeds, but still very similar. This represents real life
scenarios, such as vehicles in a city or motorway,
where the relative speed of vehicles moving in the
same direction is low.
(b) Initial vehicle density. Different simulations were run
for initial vehicle densities of 200, 100, 50, 25, 20,
13.33, 10, 8, 6.67, 5, 4 and 3.33 vehicles/km.15
For each combination of the previous parameters, thirty
different simulations were performed, changing the speeds
and initial positions of the vehicles, as well as the seed of
the random number generator of the simulator. The fol-
lowing metrics were evaluated:14 The maximum speed limit in Spain is 120 km/h.
15 This means that at the beginning of each simulation, the 50 nodes were
uniformly distributed within a road of a length of 0.25, 0.5, 1, 2, 2.5, 3.75,
5, 6.25, 7.5, 10, 12.5 and 15 km, respectively, and then they started to move
at their respective speeds.(1) Average end-to-end throughput. This is the mean TCP
throughput obtained when performing bulk file trans-
fers. This evaluates the improvement in terms of
throughput obtained when using VARON, as well
as the possible effects that the use of VARON may
have in TCP (e.g., due to the HomeM Care-of Route
handovers).
(2) Average Care-of Route acquisition latency. This is the
average delay between the sending of a Care-of Route
Test Init packet by an originator MR for discovering
and establishing a Care-of Route to a target MR, and
the receipt of the Mobile Network Prefix Binding
Update message that makes the MR add a Care-of
Route entry to its IP routing table. This includes
the delays of the signalling messages sent through
the VANET (CoRTI, CoRT and MNPBU), the pro-
cessing time due to the cryptographic operations per-
formed on each routing message and the delay due to
the use of the infrastructure (Home Route) to send
HoRT messages.
(3) Average Care-of Route length. This is the average
length of the Care-of Route discovered and set-
up by VARON. It is calculated by averaging the
number of hops taken by MNPBU messages to
reach their destination (the path followed by an
MNPBU message is the same that the one that
data packets sent through the VANET would fol-
low afterwards).
(4) Average frequency of route changes. This is the aver-
age number of HomeM Care-of Route changes per
minute. This evaluates the stability of the Care-of
routes discovered by VARON.
(5) Average Care-of Route data packet fraction. This is
the fraction of delivered data packets that are sent
through a Care-of Route. This evaluates the fraction
of data traffic that is actually forwarded through an
optimised route, and therefore the likelihood of using
VARON to optimise a traffic communication
between two vehicles that are relatively close each
other.
(6) Average VARON signalling load (bytes). This is the
ratio of overhead bytes to delivered data bytes using
a Care-of Route. This metric was measured counting
the amount of VARON signalling bytes received at a
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through the Care-of Route (data packets received
through the Home Route were not taken into
account for this calculation).
(7) Average VARON signalling load (packets). Similar to
the previous metric, but a ratio of signalling packets
to data packets overhead.
On each simulation only two nodes out of the 50 were
communicating each other. Simulations involving more
nodes communicating simultaneously were also performed
to validate the correct operation of the solution. The
throughput and signalling load metrics were obtained sim-
ulating a scenario in which a 2 MB file is transferred from a
vehicle to another, using FTP. For the rest of the metrics,
the scenario consisted of a UDP VoIP flow (GSM,
24.2 kbit/s, 50 packets per second) sent from a vehicle to
another.
To simulate the delay added by the use of the NEMO
Basic Support protocol [5] and the traversal of the respec-
tive Home Networks of the involved vehicles, an additional
delay (one-way) of 36 ms was introduced in the infrastruc-
ture network. This additional latency represents the delay
required to go through two Home Networks located in
Europe (the value was chosen based on real RTT measure-
ments16 obtained from the PingER project [22]).17 It should be recalled that in the simulations each vehicle moves with a
constant velocity, which is a randomvariable uniformly distributed between
0.9v and 1.1v (the mean speed, v, is varied from 1 to 120 km/h). This causes
that in those scenarios where the mean speed (v) is higher, the relative speed5.3. Simulation results
Simulation results are presented next in Figs. 8–13.
Results are plotted using three-dimensional graphs, so the
impact of the vehicle density and speed on each of the sim-
ulated metrics can be easily evaluated. Each data point is
an average of thirty simulations run with different ran-
domly generated mobility patterns (but following the con-
siderations described above about speed and movement
within a road).
Fig. 8 shows the average route acquisition latency, that
is the time taken by VARON to find and set-up a Care-of
Route. VARON requires each MR along the path to per-
form several cryptographic operations when processing a
control packet, such as the verification and generation of
digital signatures and CGAs. This is computationally
demanding and therefore adds additional delay to the over-
all route acquisition time. Another source of latency in the
route acquisition time is the use of the infrastructure net-
work (i.e., Home Route) in the Care-of Route validation
process, that causes an additional delay – equal to the
sum of the RTTs of each MR to its respective HA – in
the Care-of Route discovery time. Therefore, the route
acquisition time is higher in VARON than in other ad
hoc routing protocols, although in VARON this time does
not have a direct impact on normal data packet forward-
ing, as data traffic delivery is guaranteed by the use of16 Available at http://www-iepm.slac.stanford.edu/pinger/.the Home Route. Since an important contribution to the
overall route acquisition time comes from the crypto-
graphic operations performed on each hop, this time is
higher when the vehicle density decreases, because in a less
populated VANET, the average number of intermediate
MRs involved in a communication is higher (this will be
shown later in Fig. 9). However, if the average distance
between vehicles is too high (that is, the vehicle density is
quite low), this may lead to the situation where only direct
1-hop communications are possible (this explains why the
route acquisition time decreases for very low vehicle
densities).
Vehicle speed has also an effect on the Care-of Route
acquisition time – although this effect is minor than the
vehicle density – especially in highly populated scenarios.
This effect is caused by the fact that it is more likely that
more intermediate nodes are required to participate in
the Care-of Route in high speed scenarios, since the dis-
tance between two vehicles that are communicating
increases (because the relative speed of the vehicles is
higher than in low mobility scenarios17).
Fig. 9 shows the average Care-of Route length. The
results shown in this graph basically confirm what has been
discussed in the previous paragraph, that is, the strong
dependency that the route acquisition time has on the num-
ber of hops of the Care-of Route. Since the delay caused by
the HoRT messages traversing the infrastructure is the
same for each route, independently of its length, the cost
of performing cryptographic operations on each hop is
an important factor in the route acquisition time. Obtained
results show that for highly populated scenarios, two MRs
within the VANET are able to communicate directly
almost always. For very low populated scenarios, the aver-
age number of hops of a Care-of Route decreases, since it is
more difficult to establish a route within the VANET,
unless the two MRs can communicate directly. Vehicle
speed also has an impact on the length of the route, at fas-
ter speeds the Care-of Route length increases (the reason
for that is the same that the one for the increment in the
acquisition time explained above).
From the obtained average number of hops involved
in a Care-of Route, it may be deduced that VARON,
although it is not designed to explicitly find the shortest
path in terms of number of hops, usually finds the short-
est route, since the first CoRTI received at the target
MR normally travels along the shortest path (this may
not be true in situations of network congestion, where
the fastest path may not be the shortest). Therefore,of twomoving vehicles will be also higher. For example, if v is 120 km/h, the
speed of each vehicle is uniformly distributed between 108 and 132 km/h, so
the relative velocity of two vehicles may be up to 24 km/h.
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Fig. 9. Average Care-of Route length.
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Care-of Route.
Fig. 10 shows the average frequency of route changes,
that is the number of times during the lifetime of a com-
munication flow that the route used to forward the pack-
ets switches from a Care-of Route to the Home Route,
and vice-versa. This metric is important in order to eval-
uate the stability of the optimised Care-of routes.
Obtained results show that the frequency of route changes
grows when the vehicle density decreases, which is an
expected behaviour, since in highly populated scenarios
the Care-of Route average length is small, so it is less
probable that the route changes because there are less
involved MRs. In very low populated scenarios, the fre-
quency of route changes decreases, because it is less likelythat a Care-of Route can be established and used, and
therefore the number of route changes is smaller (i.e.,
most of the times traffic is forwarded through the Home
Route).
Fig. 11 shows the average Care-of Route data packet
fraction, which is the fraction of delivered packets that
are received through a Care-of Route. Therefore, this met-
ric represents the likelihood of optimising the traffic by
using the VANET. Obtained results show that there are
more opportunities of optimising a communication in high
populated scenarios and that the speed has also a small
effect on the probability of establishing a Care-of Route
(in highly mobile scenarios the probability is lower). This
result is also expected, since in those situations where a
small number of hops is required to communicate two
00.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5 5.5
log (Initial vehicle density (vehicles/km)) 0
20
40
60
80
100
120
Vehicle speed (km/h)
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
Average frequency of route changes
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over, more stable.
Fig. 12 shows the average end-to-end TCP throughput
obtained results.18 In order to compare the performance
obtained by VARON with other approaches, the TCP
throughput obtained with the NEMO Basic Support proto-
col and MIRON are also shown. Fig. 12a shows the results
when VARON is enabled in the vehicles. The TCP
throughput decreases with decreasing vehicle density, since
in scenarios with low population of vehicles, it is harder to
set-up a Care-of Route, longer paths (see Fig. 9) are usually
required, and the configured routes have short lifetimes
(see Fig. 10). As it was shown in Fig. 11, this leads to a
low fraction of data traffic being sent through the VANET,
and therefore the overall performance is poor. Besides, the
fact of not having implemented the detection of broken
routes has also an impact on the obtained TCP through-
put, since the packet loss – that may be experienced when
a route breaks until it is deleted from the IP routing table
(after its expiration) – makes TCP congestion protocol
reduce its transmission rate.19 Actually, for very low vehi-
cle densities, the performance obtained with the NEMO
Basic Support protocol (approximately 275 kbit/s, as
shown in Fig. 12b) or MIRON (approximately 300 kbit/
s, as shown in Fig. 12c) is better than with VARON. How-
ever, obtained results show that for scenarios not so low
populated – as urban or even inter-urban scenarios, where
vehicles are typically distributed within roads with inter-18 In the experiments, the following configuration was used on the nodes:
a TCP receive buffer size of 87,380 bytes and the TCP Window Scale
option enabled. This represents a standard TCP configuration nowadays
(this is the default configuration of a Linux-2.6 machine).
19 The retransmission threshold behaviour used in the simulations was
configured according to the TCP standard and ensuring that connections
could not break because of excessive retransmission attempts.vehicle distances of less than 150 m – VARON outperforms
both NEMO Basic Support protocol and MIRON. For
high vehicle densities (e.g., traffic jams), the TCP through-
put obtained with VARON is close to 1 Mbit/s, which is a
great improvement over the non vehicular optimised proto-
cols (NEMO and MIRON). This improvement is provided
by VARON because of two main reasons:
• VARON enables the use of a VANET network built
using an access technology – such as IEEE 802.11 – that
typically has more bandwidth that the access technology
used by a vehicle to connect to the Internet (e.g., GPRS/
UMTS).
• VARON enables direct data packet forwarding within
the VANET, avoiding to use the infrastructure network
and therefore reducing drastically the end-to-end delay.
Since TCP performance is heavily dependent on the
round trip time (RTT) between the communication
peers, this end-to-end delay reduction contributes to
the TCP throughput improvement.
The last simulated metric was the signalling load intro-
duced by VARON. Fig. 13 shows the signalling load, mea-
sured both in bytes and packets. Obtained results show that
the overhead introduced by VARON, because of periodic
HoAA messages and the Care-of Route discovery, is not
negligible. VARON’s byte signalling load (shown in
Fig. 13a) reaches almost 70% in low populated and high
speed scenarios, although it is about 20% for the rest of
the scenarios (e.g., urban and inter-urban). Results show
that there is a constant amount of overhead caused by
the periodic HoAA flooding, but the main contribution
to this overhead comes from the Care-of Route discovery
and set-up signalling.
Although VARON’s byte signalling is not negligible, it is
relatively low in most of the scenarios. VARON’s packet
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requires a great amount of small signalling packets to work
(the number of received VARON signalling packets even
reaches 35 times the number of data packets in theworst case
scenario). This is caused by the periodic HoAA flooding and
also by the flooding nature of the Care-of Route discovery
signalling. Besides, the same signalling is required periodi-
cally to refresh an already established route.
VARON’s overhead may seem to be very high and
therefore it may be argued that it is not a good optimisa-
tion mechanism. However, there are several considerations
that should be taken into account:
• Almost all the signalling required by VARON is sent
through the ad hoc interface. This interface is not used
to send non optimised regular traffic and it has typically
no cost associated. It may be argued that sending so
many packets imposes a non negligible energy cost,
but in vehicles this cost is not so important, since they
have a powerful and rechargeable source of energy.
On the other hand, the computational cost associated
to sending this signalling may have an impact on the
overall performance of the Mobile Router. Simulations
have taken into account the cost associated to the cryp-
tographic computations performed on each packet, but
forwarding a packet has also a cost, that depending on
the MR’s capabilities may be relevant.
• The VARON simulated model does not implement the
detection of broken links and the CoRE associated sig-
nalling. By implementing this missing part, other config-
uration parameters – such as the periodic timers
involved in the Care-of Route discovery and refresh-
ment – could be set to less aggressive values (in terms
of periodicity and, therefore, associated overhead).
The refreshment of a Care-of Route – through periodic
CoRTI/CoRT signalling – could even be removed if thealgorithm followed to detect broken links is good
enough and ensures that all broken links can be
detected. If not, it could always be optimised, for exam-
ple by not re-doing the full Care-of Route discovery pro-
cess (that involves a partial flooding of the VANET),
but just sending a probe packet through the established
Care-of Route to check if it is still working.
Although graphs only display average values for the dif-
ferent simulated metrics, the normalised standard deviation
has also been calculated. Obtained results show that the
normalised standard deviation is higher in the low popu-
lated and high mobile scenarios than in the high populated
and low mobile scenarios, meaning that former scenarios
are more unstable than the latter ones.
One important conclusion that can be drawn from the
simulation work is that in highly mobile and low populated
scenarios, it is more difficult to set-up a multi-hop route
between two vehicles, mainly because of the instability in
the ad hoc routing. Therefore, most of the chances of com-
munication involve routes with a very low number of hops.
An example of communication scenario that will greatly
benefit from VARON optimisations would be that of mil-
itary convoys or emergency service operations, where a
group of vehicles move together.
6. Conclusions
In this paper, we have analysed the problem of enabling
communications from and between vehicles. A first step is
the provision of connectivity to the Internet. Cars will likely
have specialised devices (Mobile Routers) that will provide
network access to the rest of the devices in the car, i.e., the
car will contain a Mobile Network. For this reason we pro-
pose the application of Network Mobility solutions to this
scenario. TheNEMOBasic Support protocol is the straight-
C.J. Bernardos et al. / Computer Communications 30 (2007) 1765–1784 1783forward option. Theperformance limitations of this scenario
can be partially overcome through the application of a
NEMO Route Optimisation solution.
In this paper we have proposed VARON, a solution that
enables optimal direct vehicle-to-vehicle communication,
using an ad hoc network. VARON benefits from the simul-
taneous reachability of vehicles through the infrastructure
and the ad hoc network to secure the communications in
the ad hoc part. Although the proposed solution does
not preclude the possibility of performing some Denial of
Service attacks, that are inherent to the ad hoc environ-
ment, these attacks only affect the ad hoc route and the
vehicles can always fall back on the communication
through the infrastructure if needed. The benefit of the pro-
posed mechanism is a clear improvement in end-to-end
throughput and delay with security guarantees similar to
those available in infrastructure communications.
The proposed protocol has been validated and evaluated
through extensive simulation conducted with OPNET.
Results show that VARON improves significantly the per-
formance in terms of TCP throughput when compared to
other approaches such as the use of plain NEMOBasic Sup-
port protocol or a generic Route Optimisation solution for
NEMO– such asMIRON–not suited for vehicular environ-
ments in which cars obtain Internet access from a low-band-
width and high-delay access technology (e.g., GPRS/
UMTS). Simulation has also shown that in highly mobile
and low populated scenarios, the probability of using the
VANET to route traffic is low, because of the instability in
the ad hoc routing. Most of the opportunities of optimised
communication involve routes with a very low number of
hops (less than 5 hops). Hence, scenarios such as urban
and inter-urban communications (e.g., traffic jams, vehicles
in a motorway) may greatly benefit from deploying
VARON, especially in the case of a group of vehiclesmoving
together, such as military convoys or emergency service
operations. On the other hand, it is notworth usingVARON
in highly mobile and low populated scenarios – such as high-
ways – since the probability of optimising a communication
is very low and its lifetime would be very short.
Although the paper has presented VARON as a solution
suited for vehicular environments, its applicability is not
limited to that scenario. Actually, any scenarios involving
mobile networks that are able to set-up an ad hoc network,
are good candidates for VARON deployment. For exam-
ple, passengers on a train carrying their Personal Area Net-
works (PANs) may be using peer-to-peer file sharing or
Instant Messaging (IM) applications while travelling (e.g.,
by using a PDA or laptop connected to a mobile phone
with 3G and WLAN capabilities acting as the Mobile Rou-
ter). If the two users involved in the peer-to-peer communi-
cation are located within the same train, their MRs may
decide to bypass the routing infrastructure and directly
send their traffic using a direct ad hoc communication.
An interesting issue that we have not analysed in this
paper is the applicability of VARON to provide Route
Optimisation in nested NEMO scenarios. Additionally,when VARON is not used in vehicular environments, the
power consumption of the solution may be an issue, and
therefore it is interesting to study how VARON performs
in battery-limited environments. We are currently working
on both topics in order to understand if VARON applica-
bility can be also extended to these two scenarios.
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